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INTRODUCTION-A PROPOSAL TO SUPPLANT THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY ARRANGEMENTS
In a typical year American enterprises expend a substantial amount of
money-possibly in excess of $1.5 billion-as a result of "third party"
claims deriving from a relative handful of workers' compensation cases.1
In comparison, the workers' compensation system dispenses $5.5 bil-
t This article is part of a larger study, Disability in the United States, pursued by the
author under a grant from the Social Security Administration-Social and Rehabilitation Services
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and administered and supported by the
Ohio State University Research Foundation. SSA-SRS gave permission for the publication of
this segment. The Washington University School of Law also facilitated pursuit of the study.
* Walter D. Coles Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. B.A.,
1943, Oberlin College; LLB., 1948, Columbia Law School.
I. See Appendix infra, which presents the basis for this estimate.
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lion2 in benefits to fifty times as many claimants. This article proposes
the abolition of third party suits and suggests a new system to obtain
supplementation from third parties without suit (discussed in Parts VII
and VIII) with which to pay improved workers' compensation. This
system would reduce employer and third party costs and increase em-
ployee compensation benefits, spread those benefits more equitably, and
better serve the goal of allocating cost according to degree of risk,
without sacrificing either safety incentives or moral values which argu-
ably the present arrangements serve. Under this proposal, third party
liability would be extinguished in return for which third parties engaged
in activities which usually produce compensable injury would contribute
to a supplementary workers' compensation fund at rates related to their
injury-causing history. The savings effectuated by eliminating the con-
siderable costs of processing third party claims would enable third parties
to reduce their insurance costs. The proceeds of this fund would be used
to increase workers' compensation benefits, especially to those sustain-
ing more serious injuries (who tend to obtain proportionally less compen-
sation than the less seriously injured) and, if sufficient, would fuel cost-
of-living adjustments.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 3
Each year an estimated 31,500 injuries compensable under workers'
compensation involve formal claims against someone other than the
employer (a third party) seeking damages based upon negligence or
products liability doctrines. Although a small fraction of the total
caseload, these claims constitute a significant portion of compensation
payout and produce dramatically larger recoveries than normal workers'
compensation claims.
The workers' compensation laws of every state require employers to
pay an employee who sustains an injury "arising out of and in the course
of his employment" specified amounts in weekly benefits and for needed
2. Price, Workers' Compensation: Coverage, Payments and Costs, 1975, 40 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 31, 33 (Jan. 1977). This figure excludes black lung program payments. It
includes "regular" compensation and medical/hospital payments.
3. This article does not concern itself with the niceties or even garden-variety
complexities of third party law. Rather, it focuses upon the general nature of third party
claims under workers' compensation laws (other than the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act), what they total, who pays them, the advantages and
disadvantages of such arrangements, and the advantages and disadvantages of the alterna-
tive proposed. This section, which sketches only the essentials, derives primarily from 2A
A. LARsoN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1976).
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medical care. (Usually, the employer's insurer processes the claim and
makes the payments.) In return for the employer's absolute liability for
such specified amounts, the law relieves it of any common law liability it
may have had based on negligence.
Workers' compensation laws, however, do not affect the injured
employee's cause of action against third parties. Consequently, an em-
ployee with a compensable claim may also seek damages based on
negligence or products liability theories against a third party. The em-
ployer who paid (or whose insurer paid) the workers' compensation
benefits and medical care costs has a right to share in the employee's
recovery against the third party up to the amount it expended in benefits
or, in some states, to compel or institute suit in the stead of the employee
for that purpose. As with tort and products liability suits, most third party
claims proceed to settlement rather than judgment.4 The employer's and
employee's interests in such suits often conflict, however, and the em-
ployer (or its insurer) can, and often does, settle its suit for the amount of
its claim without producing any recovery for the employee to whom any
amount over the compensation claim belongs (less a proportional share of
attorney fees and court costs).
II. WHO ARE THRD PARTIES
Although no data exists that shows the numbers and characteristics of
third parties, litigated cases and experience indicate that many have some
direct relation to the employer, employment, or employee (such as a
subcontractor working alongside the contractor's injured employee or the
4. MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AMAPI
SURVEY (1976), reported in I INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PRODUCT
LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY STUDY IV-82 [hereinafter referred to as
INTERAGENCY INDUSTRY STUDY] noted that for the period 1970-75 claim disposition
followed this pattern:
Percent of
of claims Claims Disposed
Total Claims 16,785 -
Claims rejected by company 2,858 31
Claims paid administratively 4,396 48
Suits settled out of court 1,218 13
Court judgments against company 212 2
Court judgments for company 464 5
Total Dispositions 9,148
Suits pending 3,203
Claims pending 3,272
Number 4]
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manufacturer of the employer's equipment) while others are strangers
(such as a truck owner whose equipment strikes the employee on a
highway). The states differ as to who may be considered a third person
for purposes of common law suit: some jurisdictions regard anyone other
than the immediate employer as a third person; 5 others grant immunity to
employees in the same employment; 6 and some grant immunity to the
employer, fellow employees, and all contractors and their employees
engaged in a common employment. In addition, several statutes7 leave
the matter in doubt, thus requiring judicial resolution; the courts' re-
sponses, predictably, have varied.
States granting immunity from suit to co-employees do so only when
the co-employee acts "in the course of his employment." The question
arises as to which course of employment test applies-the workers'
compensation or the tort vicarious liability test. California, on the one
hand, bars tort suit against a co-employee only if the co-employee
actively performed some service for the employer at the time of the
injury. Consequently, an employee may receive workers' compensation
because injured within the course of employment, but not be immune
from suit arising out of the same incident because not engaged in service
for purposes of tort immunity. For example, an employee struck in a
parking lot after work by a co-employee's automobile was not barred
from suing the co-employee even though the co-employee received
compensation benefits for an injury suffered in the course of employ-
ment.8 (Such a result boosts automobile insurance rates and lowers
workers' compensation rates, the latter a more cost/benefit efficient
coverage.) In contrast, the test adopted by New Jersey9 simply uses the
regular workers' compensation course of employment standard for both
eligibility for benefits and immunity from suit. (Such a result fixes the
burden of such occurrences upon the workers' compensation coverage.)
In certain situations a general contractor may be considered a third
party. For example, the general contractor remains liable to third party
actions by a subcontractor's employees unless it meets the conditions for
5. Approximately one third of the states have such statutes. 2A A. LARSON, supra
note 3, § 72.10, at 37 (Supp. 1977).
6. 30 states statutes do so. Id § 72.20, at 42-45 (Supp. 1977).
7. See statutes cited id.; Note, Workmen's Compensation: Third Party Actions in
South Dakota, 18 S.D.L. REv. 423, 425 n.13 (1973).
8. Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 403 P.2d 400, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1965).
9. Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super. 376, 195 A.2d 649 (1963).
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establishing the status of a statutory employer. In all but seven states,
"statutory employer" legislation requires that the general contractor
provide workers' compensation benefits to the employee of a subcontrac-
tor under him who performs work that constitutes a part of the general
contractor's business, trade, or occupation. 10 Although these statutes
ordinarily apply in the case of an uninsured subcontractor, they occasion-
ally impose liability whether or not the subcontractor is insured. In the
latter jurisdictions the courts generally do not allow third party tort
actions by the subcontractor's employees against the prime contractor,
reasoning that the statute makes the general contractor an "employer"
and hence immune from liability. When the statutes subject the general
contractor to only a secondary obligation (to provide compensation if the
subcontractor fails to do so), the courts ordinarily hold that a general
contractor not liable for compensation in lieu of the subcontractor is
subject to third party liability.
If the actual employer of the injured worker were an independent
contractor over whom the general contractor had no control, the general
contractor would remain subject to third party suit. Thus, if a plumbing
contractor hired by a builder to install bathroom fixtures in a home
retained the right to hire and fire his employees and do the work
according to his own judgment and methods without supervision, the
builder would remain liabile to third party suit by the plumbing contrac-
tor's injured employees.
The majority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, permit the employee
of a general contractor to proceed against the subcontractor as a third
party. This results from the quite formal reasoning that, although the
subcontractor is doing the general contractor's work, the subcontractor
cannot be regarded as the injured employee's employer, even though the
contractor may stand in the shoes of the subcontractor vis-a-vis the
subcontractor's employee. Such recoveries by contractors' employees
against subcontractors necessarily increase the liability insurance rates of
subcontractors. This cost of doing business must be reflected, in full or in
part, in the prices subcontractors charge to contractors. Thus the work-
ers' compensation limitation upon the contractors' liability disappears.
This certainly seems neither rational nor desirable for the overall system,
but results from the interests of the several parties' insurers to shift the
particular claim to another insurer.
10. A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.31, at 14-47.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In addition, the one incident leads to more than one claim proceeding,
which multiplies costs. Indeed, often both the general and the subcon-
tractor will purchase both compensation and liability insurance covering
some of the same costs. In so doing, all pay overhead costs and other
non-benefit charges of their insurers. Hence contractors end up paying
pure premium (actual payout) for the equivalent of the workers' compen-
sation, plus the portion of the third party liability recovery exceeding the
compensation, plus the costs of pursuing and defending the third party
claim. Whether or not such accidents actually occur on a particular
project, the general contractors' costs, and therefore the builders' costs,
rise to cover the multiple insurance arrangements.
Managers and executives may also be subject to third party suits.
Often the employer insures them for work-related liability. Such arrange-
ments produce two odd results: the "guilty" party does not bear the cost
of the injury and the employer, supposedly afforded limited liability
under the compensation act, pays additional insurance costs.
Permitting recovery against a fellow employee, if it can be collected,
enables an injured employee to increase his total award beyond the
compensation benefit. But the sums recovered against third parties do not
come as net gains. Costs for pressing the claim, often including substan-
tial attorneys' fees, reduce the net recovery to both employee and the
employer or its insurer (discussed in VI below).
I. EMPLOYER RIGHTS AGAINST THIRD PARTY
An employer who pays compensation for an injury caused by the
negligence of a third person ordinarily has a right to share in its employ-
ee's cause of action against the third person. The compensation acts of
most states (a) provide for subrogation, (b) grant the employer a lien on
the employee's recovery, or (c) assign the employee's action to the
employer. Whatever form the employer's right to share in his employee's
action takes, it remains limited to reimbursement for the amount he
paid.II
Most jurisdictions that have considered the question hold that the
compensation act provides the only basis for the third party's liability to
the employer. 2 Thus, in the three jurisdictions without statutory subroga-
tion provisions--Georgia, Ohio, and West Virginia-the courts ordinari-
11. Id. § 71.20, at 14-2 -14-4. A few narrow exceptions exist.
12. See id. § 77.10, at 14-408-14-430.
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ly deny the employer a right to recover compensation payments from a
third party.
IV. THIRD PARTY RIGHTS AGAINST EMPLOYER
Only one state confers upon a third party the right to contribution by
the employer."3 The courts in jurisdictions that otherwise permit contri-
bution in tort suits generally deny contribution recovery against the
employer. They reason that no joint liability exists between the third
party and the employer because the employer's liability arises from its
status while the third party's liability arises from its negligence 4 or
products liability. This denial of contribution enables the employer to
shift his entire burden to a third party even when the employer has
partially caused the injury. Hence a "wrongdoer" in Larson's lan-
guage,"5 escapes most of the cost of its "wrong."
An injured employee's third party claim (or that of the employer suing
in his stead) remains subject to the defense of contributory negligence
and is reducible in comparative negligence jurisdictions in proportion to
the employee's "fault." The employer's contributory negligence, how-
ever, normally is irrelevant since the employer's suit derives solely from
his employee's cause of action. Consequently, the employer's contribu-
tory negligence will not bar a third party recovery.
V. JUSTIFICATION OF THRD PARTY LIABILITY ASSESSED
All workers' compensation systems in the United States recognize that
a worker who incurs a compensable injury, or his dependents in the event
of his death, retains a cause of action against a third person whose
negligence caused the injury. Since the compensation system undertook
to replace fault recovery with a form of compulsory insurance, so that
losses resulting from accidents would be viewed as a cost of production
to be paid by the enterprise and then passed on to the consumer in the
form of higher prices, a question arises as to whether such third party
suits should exist.
A. Professor McCoid's Three Arguments
Professor Allan McCoid 16 offers three justifications for retaining rights
against third parties despite his acceptance of the enterprise liability
13. See id. § 76.22, at 14-307.
14. Id. § 76.21, at 14-298.
15. Id. § 71.10, at 14-1-14-2.
16. McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities
and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEX. L. REv. 389 (1959).Washington University Open Scholarship
550 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
concept. First, he argues that the risk of accident through the intervention
of someone outside the employment relationship does not constitute a
"typical" or inherent risk of the enterprise, although for compensation
purposes the injury is viewed as arising out of and in the course of
employment. While the connection between the injury and the employ-
er's enterprise might justify requiring it to bear some of the burden of
loss, McCoid argues that it does not justify relieving the third party of all
responsibility. Further, in many accidents the injury is just as typical of
the third party's commercial or industrial activity as of the employer's.
Second, both tort and enterprise liability proceed, in part, on the
shared assumption that compensation should be provided at the least cost
to society, and that the enterprise can better distribute and bear the risk
than an injured employee who cannot readily nor so efficiently insure
against such hazards. Whereas tort liability ideally provides for recovery
of the victim's actual losses-including pain and suffering as well as
past, present, and future medical expenses and loss of earning capacity-
workers' compensation does not provide such extensive coverage.
Further, McCoid argues that by imposing liability upon the third party
enterprise, many accidents can be eliminated through safety programs,
which only those enterprises can initiate. Even in the case of individual
(non-business) third parties, the possibility of some deterrence from
unreasonable conduct cannot be ignored, he asserts.
Yet in certain principal-third party relationships the parties are not
strangers, their physical juxtaposition is frequent and typical, and ac-
tivities of employees of one often endanger the other. Even "stranger"
contacts frequently are "typical." A newspaper truck driver, for exam-
ple, or a construction or repair person at work in streets, "typically" can
be expected to be battered in some predictable proportion of cases by
"stranger" motorists. Furthermore, many employee injuries sustained at
the hands of strangers result from a combination of the stranger's and the
employer's activities and the ways that our society organizes production,
commerce, trade, and leisure. Accepting McCoid's observation that
many injuries are as typical of the third party as they are of the employer,
it is proposed here that the law can hold such third parties financially
accountable for such typical occurances without subjecting them and the
injured to the inefficiencies of third party suits.
Theoretically, tort recovery provides a fuller recovery for the employ-
ee "lucky" enough to be injured by a third party's negligence. The third
party suit, however, is a questionable way of achieving that fuller
recovery. The tort system skimps most on the seriously damaged, just as
[Vol. 1977:543
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workers' compensation does. In addition, when the employer or its
insurer rather than the employee brings the third party proceeding, it may
seek to recover only its compensation payment. The unrepresented or
poorly represented employee may agree to settle, unaware that reim-
bursement of the compensation payer has first priority against the tort
recovery. Moreover, if the employee is represented, he must pay for two
proceedings-his claim for workers' compensation and his tort claim
against the third party.
The third McCoid argument, deterrence, is a constant issue in all
discussions of tort. Its validity is open to serious question except in the
realm of products liability where the third party has real control over
design, materials, workmanship, supervision, and quality and would
have a lively appreciation of the liability costs of lapses. Even in such
situations, however, the manufacturer may respond to its possible liabili-
ty by limiting its warranty rather than limiting the product's hazards. In
other circumstances, the third party's lapse may be typical and not
readily deterred (as with most drivers, for example). Or the deterrence
incentive may be muffled by insurance, especially for those not experi-
ence rated (if, indeed, the beneficent safety-inducing effects claimed for
experience ratings occur in the real world).
B. Professor Larson's "Moral" Arguments
Larson argues that "[t]he concept underlying third party actions is the
moral idea that the ultimate loss from wrongdoing should fall upon the
wrongdoer."' 7 He states that, although workers' compensation departs
from the moral basis of fault liability so as to provide an assumed
recovery to the injured person, the modification should not extend to
"change the rules on how the ultimate burden was borne."' 8 He seems to
combine two arguments: (1) that the "wrongdoer" should pay as a
matter of morality; and (2) that the financial burden should fall upon the
wrongdoer as a matter of proper economic allocation.
The "moral" justification for holding the co-employee liable rests
upon the principle that a person whose negligence causes injury should
bear the consequences of his own wrongdoing. While the "moral" basis
would seem to depend upon actual negligence, many recoveries result
from presumptions that substitute for proof of negligence; actual causa-
17. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 71.10, at 14-1.
18. Id.
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tion thus may be lacking. Moreover, this reasoning, with its emphasis
upon blameworthiness, is questionable in many accident situations.
In automobile caused injuries, for example, the occurrence of an actual
accident is often fortuitous, resulting from common driver lapses which
usually produce no mishap. Most "negligent" drivers, therefore, are
morally indistinguishable from the bulk of drivers. Whether fastening the
responsibility upon such fortuitously unfortunate individuals stimulates
the exercise of greater care by many in the group is debatable. In most
cases the insurer, rather than the "responsible" individual or employer,
responds in damages. And often in the third party situation not the lax
individual, but his employer, pays for the insurance. The potential
impact upon the individual is arguably too attenuated to lead to greater
caution. One would suppose that a person who is amenable to such a
rational incentive would exercise care in the first place simply to protect
against harm to himself and fellow passengers. For insured individuals
whose rates do not rise commensurately because they are not experience
rated, the incentive is nonexistent or dulled. It seems to be a fact of life
that insurance practice under both fault and non-fault arrangements
spread some of the losses caused by the accident producers among the
non-producers and thus do not tax those involved in accidents with the
full consequences of those occurrences.
Third party suit will fail to fasten liability upon the "wrongdoer" in
two other situations. An employer whose negligence contributed to an
accident retains his subrogation rights in any third party recovery. The
negligent third party, however, is barred from seeking similar recom-
pense from the employer. Consequently, the third party bears the burden
for the accident while the negligent employer escapes all liability.19 In
addition, third party suits may be barred for any number of technical
legal reasons. For example, tort statutes of limitation generally ban a suit
two, or three years after the negligently caused injury. In malpractice
suits, which may be brought against physicians rendering services pro-
vided under workers' compensation, the statute may be as short as one
year. Some serious consequences of an injury may occur only after that
time has passed, yet these statutes will preclude third party compensa-
tion. (Consequently, some insurers simply institute suit whenever a slight
19. This supports the argument that either employers should be liable for negligence-
which thoroughly disrupts the workers' compensation "compromise" of certain but
limited liability-or that the third party's liability should be reduced in proportion to the
employer's liability which is the case in jurisdictions where the third party's liability is
limited to his share in the causation.
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possibility of third party liability exists, thereby incurring useless costs in
many such situations-a different but important point.)
Third party liability may vary in otherwise equal situations depending
upon how the state workers' compensation law interacts with Social
Security Disability Insurance (DI). The federal law provides for reduc-
tion of the DI benefit if the combination of DI and workers' compensa-
tion produces more than eighty percent of pre-disablement pay. Some
states, however, provide for reducing the compensation benefit when DI
also is payable. When reduction of the DI benefit rather than workers'
compensation occurs, a third party recovery for the disabled person will
be smaller than in the reverse situation because a greater part of the third
party recovery is deducted from the employee's share. This completely
fortuitous and unanticipated result is especially unfortunate since Disabil-
ity Insurance cases necessarily involve extremely serious injuries, for
which tort recoveries tend to replace a relatively small portion of actual
losses.
Shifting the financial burden to the wrongdoer also becomes imposs-
ible when the wrongdoer is unknown or uninsured. Nevertheless, a
device exists for protecting victims against damage attributable to an
uninsured or unknown driver. Several jurisdictions require, either explic-
itly or in practice, uninsured motorist coverage paid for by the potential
victim. In some cases, however, this coverage provides for the deduction
of workers' compensation medical or cash benefits; jurisdictions vary in
allowing such offset. If the uninsured motorist insurer could not make
such deductions, its payout would be greater and, therefore, its premium
charges to the class of potential victims would be higher. The question
arises whether it is more or less sensible and fair to fasten that burden
upon the workers' compensation insurers and through them upon em-
ployers. Whichever disposition occurs, employers' burdens vary depend-
ing upon the fortuitous factor of employee exposure to uninsured or
unknown motorists. (As group insurance, workers' compensation is
bound to be less costly than uninsured motorist coverage, which is
written as individual policies.)
If, as some argue, workers' compensation liability spurs employer
attention to safety because its rates may vary according to net benefits
paid to its employees, the possibility and predictability of third party
recoveries may reduce that incentive. For example, a manufacturer of
machinery may be liable to an employee of a purchaser injured by the
machine under one or another doctrine governing products liability,
despite inadequate maintenance or alteration by the employer whoseWashington University Open Scholarship
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interests focus upon low costs and high production. In the long run, the
employer's insurer charges rates based upon net payout. To the extent
that third party liability recoveries reduce that payout, the lowered
workers' compensation rates charged the employer reduce the employ-
er's need to pay attention to safety. Similarly, third party recoveries may
reduce the employer's compensation insurer's financial incentive to initi-
ate safety reviews.
In summary, if a negligent third party can be found, the employer's
insurer may reduce its net payout by recovering from the third party or its
insurer. The employee may enhance his compensation if the third party
recovery exceeds the employer's compensation payments and the out of
pocket cost of obtaining it. Whether such enhancement occurs often
depends upon factors that are fortuitous and do not vary according to the
needs of the injured employee or the employer's culpability. The first
result of third party liability is to reduce the employer's insurer's costs.
Whether it also increases the employee's frequently inadequate compen-
sation benefit, notably inadequate in cases of more serious injury, de-
pends upon whether the employee knows of his rights or secures an
attorney who knows how to navigate the shoals of third party practice.
VI. NON-BENEFIT COSTS OF THIRD PARTY ARRANGEMENTS
Whether or not third party liability enhances the injured employee's
total benefit, it undoubtedly increases the non-benefit costs of all con-
cerned. At the minimum, the employee or employer incurs expenditures
in presenting and negotiating the third party claim, often duplicating
material prepared for the presentation of the original compensation
claim. In addition, attorney expenses frequently will be incurred by both
sides. The third party and its insurer will expend time and effort on
receiving the claim, conducting investigations (duplicating the efforts of
the original claimant and the employer's insurer), negotiating, and possi-
bly litigating. In products liability cases, for instance, some experience
sets the cost of defense of a claim at additional expenditures of thirty-five
cents for each dollar paid in settlements and judgments.20 As with all tort
claims, the parties settle most third party cases. Often insurers pay claims
because of their nuisance value. They compromise others, despite doubts
about liability, because of the costs and risks of going to trial and
verdict.21 Cases that go to trial, verdict, and judgment occasionally
20. See Appendix infra.
21. H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT (1970) documents this well known practice for automobile tort claims.
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produce dramatically large recoveries which stimulate other third party
claims and encourage hard claimant bargaining.
In sum, third party liability raises prices because all the possible risk
bearers insure separately and build their insurance costs into their prices.
The cost does not fall only upon the party ultimately liable because each
party in the chain incurs commission and other costs of duplicative
insurance. Moreover, the resulting multiple procedures increase the non-
benefit costs of all parties.
At a rough estimate, third party claims generate $1.5 billion22 in third
party payments, a small fraction of which reduces workers' compensa-
tion premiums, at a substantial cost to employees, employers, and third
parties. As a consequence, the allocation function (charging the guilty,
increasing its costs, and thus lessening its ability to compete) may not
operate as advertised. The program proposed here would capture third
party funds for more compensation at less cost, with more certainty,
better allocation effects, and fairer outcomes to employers, employees,
and third parties.
VII. ELIMINATING THIRD PARTY SUiTS, IMPROVING COMPENSATION
BENEFITS WHILE REDUCING WORKERS' COMPENSATION
AND THRD PARTY CosT23
The "Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Amendments of 1972"24 suggest a way to reduce compensation and third
party costs and improve compensation benefits. Prior to 1972, employee
representatives complained that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act paid inadequate benefits. Simultaneously, ship-
owners and stevedores (the companies that provide loading and unload-
ing services to ships with longshore employees) experienced rapid and
dramatic increases in liability insurance costs due to application of the
"unseaworthiness" doctrine. Under that doctrine, the shipowner (or
charterer) had the duty to provide those who worked on ships with a
seaworthy vessel. In effect, the vessel owner (or charterer) had almost
22. See Appendix infra.
23. The book of which this article will be a part introduces a more comprehensive
proposal that deals with non-employee injury and illness as well. This article assumes that
in the short run, greater interest and possibilities exist for making limited changes in
workers' compensation and third party liability arrangements.
24. 33 U.S.C. §§ 905, 906, 908, 909 (Supp. V 1975) relate to liability and compensa-
tion.
Number 4]
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absolute liability to a maritime worker injured on a vessel and often
incurred large damage awards. This situation resulted from the Supreme
Court decision that a longshoreman at work on a ship could sue the
shipowner (or charterer)-the third party-for tortlike damages for viola-
tion of the unseaworthiness doctrine. 5 The Court subsequently ruled that
the shipowner (or charterer) could sue the stevedore company which
employed the injured longshoreman for breach of implied warranty of
workmanlike performance when, as was common, the stevedore or its
employees (longshoremen) created the hazard that caused the injury. 26
Thus, despite the stevedores' limited liability under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, they (or their insurers) paid
substantial judgments to the shipowners (or charterers) for their own
employees' injuries. As a result, stevedore insurance premiums in-
creased, which led to stevedore price increases to shipowners and char-
terers. In addition, shipowners and charterers incurred third party liabili-
ty costs which they could not pass back to stevedores.
Faced with accelerating costs and complaints about low compensation
benefits, shipowner, charterer, stevedore, and employee representatives
worked out a compromise: abolition of the seaworthiness doctrine for
longshore workers, thereby eliminating that brand of third party suit,
accompanied by a significant increase in Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act benefits. The enterprises affected preferred
larger but more predictable compensation benefits payable out of the
savings effected by eliminating a particularly costly brand of third party
liability. Employee representatives preferred the increased benefits that
flowed to all longshore workers at the sacrifice of those large individual
recoveries that came to a handful of workers. Moreover, all concerned
groups shared the savings effected by eliminating overhead and adminis-
trative costs associated with such claims.
For much the same reasons and to achieve essentially the same results,
I propose the elimination of third party suits plus the adoption of
arrangements to obtain funds from those relieved of such liability to
enhance workers' compensation benefits and to reduce employer work-
ers' compensation premium rates. 27 In part, reducing third party costs
25. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
26. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
27. I drafted this proposal long before I became aware that "The Special Committee
for Workplace Product Liability Reform" proposed elimination of third party liability in
workers' compensation cases. My proposal to obtain funds from those whose liability
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can be justified on the ground that under present arrangements third
parties bear the costs of some unfortunate but quite fortuitous occur-
rences. By eliminating third party suits, several other inequities inherent
in the present system will be alleviated. No longer will negligent employ-
ers be able to avoid the costs of some accidents to which they contribu-
ted. By removing rights of subrogation from the compensation scheme,
the conflicting interests of employer and employee in third party suits
will be eliminated. The compensation afforded employees "fortunate"
enough to incur injuries implicating third parties and the usual recipients
of workers' compensation with equal impairments will be equalized. The
adoption of this proposal should also reduce the spiraling costs of all
concerned.2 8
It is unclear who bears the costs of insuring against third party liability.
Whenever possible, third parties build their liability and non-benefit costs
into their price structure. This results in a shift of much of the burden to
customers. Subcontractors, for instance, transfer their third party liability
costs to general contractors in their job rates. The general contractor,
therefore, eventually finances his employee's recoveries against such
parties. Similarly, the enterprises that must pay substantial products
liability insurance premiums add them to their sales prices, thus shifting
the costs of third party recoveries to the enterprises that purchase their
products. The costs transferred include substantial non-benefit as well as
compensation costs.29 Thus the employer's limitation of liability under
workers' compensation becomes illusory.
Elimination of third party suits would substantially reduce the rising
and often duplicative costs inherent in the present system. Unlike the
longshore situation, the abolition of third party suits in workers' corn-
would be extinguished constitutes the major difference between the two proposals. The
Committee proposal is contained in an undated 1977 processed memo entitled Pending or
Proposed Federal Product Liability Legislation (on file in Washington University Law
Quarterly office).
28. Recent workers' compensation insurer experience reportedly has been unfavor-
able. So, in 1975 the major stock company insurers and state funds reported pre-tax losses
on their workers' compensation activities. For participating stock companies, the losses
amounted to five percent of net premiums written. National Council of Compensation
Insurance, Insurance Expense Exhibit, 1975 (1976).
29. E.g., SPECIAL COMMITrEE FOR WORKPLACE LIABILITY REFORM, THE CURRENT
PRODUCT LIABILITY CRISIS (Processed 1977); I INTERAGENCY INDUSTRY STUDY 1-6,
111-2, 11-20. THE AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE ALLIANCE, SURVEY OF LARGE-Loss
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS (1977) reported several carriers' losses over $100,000 and
described defense costs of ten percent of claims paid excluding insurer's internal costs.
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pensation cases is insufficient by itself to accomplish the stated purposes.
In the longshore situation, the shipowner-charterer group as constant
purchasers of stevedoring services bore the cost of the unseaworthiness
third party liability; the elimination of that doctrine reduced the im-
mediate costs of the stevedoring employers, enabling them to afford
increased compensation payments. In contrast, non-maritime third par-
ties (other than in the contractor-subcontractor arrangements) who would
be relieved of third party liability typically are not the customers of the
injured employees' employers. Indeed, one large group of third parties
consists of strangers, whose savings from elimination of liability could
not under present arrangements reach the employer and thus enable it to
afford more ample compensation benefits. Another large group, makers
of manufacturing equipment, sells to employers only intermittently.
Their savings by virtue of eliminating their third party liability would be
passed along to a small fraction of employers, if any, in the lowered costs
of their products. Past purchasers of such goods amortize the past cost
and thus participate in price reductions, if at all, only when making a
replacement purchase at some future time. In addition, the imperfections
of the market give no assurance that third parties will translate their
savings into price reductions which would enable the purchasing employ-
ers to make larger compensation contributions.
Extinguishing third party liability without the simultaneous creation of
a supplementary workers' compensation fund would provide direct ad-
vantage only to third parties who seek such relief from rising insurance
costs. Eliminating third party liability would increase employer costs
because they no longer would be relieved of the payments currently
offset by third party recoveries. Nevertheless, by eliminating the third
party claims, administration costs, and sharing amounts otherwise de-
voted to pain and suffering, funds will become available to meet the
needs of all groups now enmeshed in the third party web.
Eliminating third party liability would make available perhaps as much
as $1.5 billion for these other purposes. To provide incentive to those
paying for insurance attributable to third party liability and in recognition
of the sometimes arbitrary imposition of liability, a substantial portion
should be translated into savings for the third party groups. The remain-
ing amount should be made available (as described in Part VIII below) to
enhance workers' compensation benefits and decrease employer compen-
sation costs. Nothing less would persuade employee representatives to
forego employee claims against third parties. If the new funds prove
quite substantial, they might enable the institution of cost-of-living ad-
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justments for compensation benefits, adjustments that generally do not
occur but are sorely needed. By sharing in the funds otherwise devoted to
third party liability, employers would have a strong incentive to support
such a change. In addition, enhanced employee benefits would reduce
pressure and justification for future benefit improvements.
The proposal simply to extinguish third party liability, besides lacking
appeal to both employers and employees, also suppresses the allocation
function according to which the costs attendant upon more hazardous
enterprises tend to reduce their ability to compete with less hazardous
enterprises that have lower insurance costs. The proposal put forward
here would maintain that allocation function at least by product line. In
addition, lower rates might be earned, not as at present by reducing claim
payout, which encourages resistance even to valid claims and thus
provides no certain guide to comparative hazard, but by adopting specific
safety devices or procedures, such as periodic product safety reviews by
an independent agency and observance of the reviewer's safety design
recommendations.
VIII. ADMINISTERING THE PROPOSAL
The first task is to ascertain the amounts that now go to pay third party
claims. Many third party groups have a known or discoverable track
record for involvement in injuries to the employees of others. By samp-
ling insurance records this information can be translated into industry
and activity accident compensation premiums and administrative costs.
Starting with those existing casualty insurance rates by industry, a samp-
ling of carriers for third party claims would make possible reasonable
estimates of the portion of premium allocable to third party claims. These
constitute the amounts to be shared.
One quarter might be earmarked for third party savings-a premium
decrease. The remainder would be mandatorily payable to a workers'
compensation supplementation fund. In other words, each employer's
contribution to the fund would be based upon his industry rate as
ascertained by examination of industry case records. Future adjustments
in the industry rates would depend upon sampling closed workers'
compensation cases to ascertain the rates of injury associated with each
industry. Individuals' insurers would vary their rates, not by "experience
rating," but by the adoption of specified safety programs, such as
product design reviews by independent experts or by the adoption of
specified safety devices. These industry rates and individual variations
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would produce precisely the allocation effects claimed for experience
rated liability insurance. Keyed to workers' compensation benefits rather
than tort or products liability recoveries, the rates would be far more
stable and predictable. The three quarters of third party premium diverted
to the supplementary fund would be shared by employers and employees.
Such amounts would be readily translated into premium reductions for all
employers and benefit increases to employees, possibly providing fuel
for cost-of-living increases.
The results of third party activities often extend beyond the states
where they originate. So, for example, products manufactured and auto-
mobiles insured in one state may contribute to injury in others. If third
party products and activities are to make their proper contribution, they
should be pooled nationally and added to existing benefit schedules.
Although "national" sounds "public," it need not be; it would, how-
ever, require federal legislation. Private insurers, state funds, self-insur-
ers, and unions could participate in a national consortium to operate the
National Insurance Compensation Enterprise-which would be NICE.
To ensure national coverage, Congress could invoke its power over
interstate commerce to establish the supplementary compensation fund
and extinguish third party liability-a classic "compromise" for which
there exists ample constitutional authority among the cases validating the
early workers' compensation acts. 0 The legislation would enable private
insurers and state funds to participate in a corporation to administer the
fund, including adjusting rates to reflect changed conditions of industry
hazards, the availability of new devices, and procedures designed to
improve products and service safety. Access to the advantages and
obligations of the corporation could be conditioned upon the state's
adoption of the national standards (obliteration of third party liability,
making third party groups subject to contributions to NICE, and adopting
specified improved compensation rates). The manner of administering
the added benefits, either directly to beneficiaries or through existing
insurers, could be left to the corporation's decision after all concerned
thoroughly canvass the varieties of such arrangements; it might even
experiment with different arrangements in several jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
The pressing need to restore reliability to the products liability field, to
temper workers' compensation costs, and to improve compensation ben-
30. E.g., New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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efits all recommend this proposal. Workers' compensation and products
liability face real and urgent problems. Both must adapt to rapidly
changing circumstances and increased demands. The program proposed
here can transform the unnecessary costs, inefficiencies, frequent unfair-
ness, and constant unpredictability of third party doctrines and practices
into practical improvements for tort, products liability, and workers'
compensation programs.
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APPENDIX-Estimated Costs of Third Party Claims
ESTIMATE OF THIRD PARTY (TP) CLAIMS COSTS FOR
WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES CLOSED IN 1974
1. Basic Statistics From Published Reports and Studies
a. Total number of WC cases closed in 1974 .................. 1,500,000
b. Percent of cases involving TP claims .......................... 2.1%
c. Mean benefit payment for permanent partial cases .......... $4,278
d. Ratio of average product-workplace-injury payment to average
WC payment for cases closed in 1972, (3,325/1,933) ........... 1.67
e. Medical and hospitalization expense for all
W C cases in 1974 ................................................ $1,750,000
f. Administrative and legal expenses for product liability claims as
a percent of benefit payments ..................................... 35%
2. Estimated Unit Costs Per TP Claim
a. Adjustment factor for relatively greater size of TP awards ..... 5.0
b. Compound adjustment factor for item Ic, (ld x2a) ............. 8.35
c. Benefit costs, (lcx2b) ............................................. $35,721
d. Administration and legal fees, (lf x2c) ........................ $12,502
e. Medical and hospitalization costs, (1.5x le/la) ............... $1,750
f. Per unit cost of TP claim (2c+2d+2e) ........................... $9,973
3. Estimated Gross and Net Additional Costs Arising From TP Claims
a. Number of TP claims, (lax lb) ................................... 31,500
b. Gross cost for all TP cases, (2f x 3a) ................ $1,570,000,000
I estimate the potential net costs of third party claims as follows:
The Closed Case Survey of the Interagency Task Force on Workers'
Compensation found that 2.1% of its considerable sample of cases
closed nationwide in 1974 involved third party claims. It estimated that in
1974 some 1,500,000 (1.a) workers' compensation cases were closed.
Hence 2.1% (1.b) would constitute roughly 31,500 cases (3.a).
I assumed that temporary disability claims generally are too small to
warrant the expenditure of time and effort required to seek reimburse-
ment from a potentially liable third party. And while death and perma-
nent total disability cases involve substantial claims, they are compara-
tively few in number. However, an estimated 121,000 permanent partial
claims were closed. For simplicity, therefore, I treated all 31,500 closed
cases involving third party claims as if they involved permanent partial
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injuries, a quite conservative assumption. The Task Force assumed a
mean permanent partial award of $4,278 (1.c).
In 1974, about $1.75 million were paid out in medicl and hospitalization
workers' compensation benefits. (1.e) Price, Workers' Compensation:
Coverage, Payments and Costs, 1975, 40 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 31, 33
(Jan. 1977). Third party cases often will involve larger than average
compensation awards. For example, one study of New York awards put
the 1972 average compensation for all closed cases at $1,998. Product
workplace injury claims (involving aircraft, chemicals, ladders, and
motor vehicles), however, produced average closed claims of $4,174,
$3,190, and $2,409 respectively (which, unweighted, average $3,325).
Thus, workplace injury claims compared with average claims produce a
ratio of 1.67.
In addition to costs involved in the workers' compensation procedure
itself, third party claims produce additional costs, which include the
acquisition costs of the third party's liability insurer, that insurer's cost
of investigating the claim (duplicating the workers' compensation insur-
er's investigation), costs of third party insurer adjustment efforts, and
costs of third party counsel and trial, and expert witnesses.
For example, one study reported products liability claims for bodily
injury require 35¢ in additional costs for each dollar paid in benefits.
(This includes costs for investigating unsuccessful claims.) The greater
part (83%) of such costs go for attorneys' fees. Defense costs averaged
$3,500 per case. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE PRODUCT LIABILITY
CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS:
HIGHLIGHTS 3-4 (1977). Whether the processing of non-products liability
third party claim cases causes equally high expenditures is not known. It
probably does. Hence, I assign 35% as the administrative and legal
expenses for products liability claims as a percentage of third party
benefit payments.
I further assumed that tort case settlements and verdicts would aver-
age out to five times the amount of compensation benefits and medical
expenditures (2.a). Several commentators report very approximate rules
of thumb for estimating the multiplier applied to "specials" to get a
"normal" settlement figure. Professor O'Connell, for instance, reports
that a rule of thumb for pain and suffering may range from "two or three,
or even seven or ten times the medical bills." J. O'CONNELL, ENDING
INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
51 (1975). One handbook puts the range at 2 1/2 to 10 x the specials, but
says that five tends to be high. C.T. JOHNS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIABILITY
CLAIMS ADJUSTING 455 (1972). Although admittedly rough, I reasoned
that compensation for the more serious injuries tend-according to in-
numerable studies-not to compensate actual losses of earnings; and
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even medical expenditures sometimes are not fully compensated. Hence,
out of pocket expenditure for workers' compensation victims would be
greater than the mean compensation benefit. I therefore applied a further
adjustment factor (2.b).
2.c shows the benefit cost per third party claim. 2.d presents the
administrative and legal fees obtained by applying the 35% third party
costs to the preceding benefits cost. 2.e represents the per case medical
and hospitalization cost for a third party claim-assumed to be 1.5xthe
average such cost for all cases (total med-hospital cost divided by total
cases). 2.f is the total per unit third party claim costs (2.c+2.d+2.e).
As noted at the outset, some 31,500 third party claims were closed in
1974 (3.a). Hence, the gross total costs of third party payments totalled
$1.57 billion (31,500 casesx$49,973 per case cost). About $.19 billion,
however, were assumed to be devoted to reducing workers' compensa-
tion payments, i.e. the average payment for permanent partial
casesx31,500. Hence, net third party expenditures available for redis-
tribution under the arguments proposed in this article come to about
$1.38 billion. This amount does not include non-benefit costs other than
investigation and litigation expenses. The attendant insurer costs (such
as advertising and promotion, commissions, taxes, etc.) should also be
shifted from third party to first party coverage. Thus, approximately all
of the third party pure premium would be available to be applied as
worker compensation benefits, with the savings to be enjoyed by third
parties derived from the portion of gross premiums devoted to investiga-
tion, negotiation, and defense of third party claims.
Under the proposal, claimants would realize higher net benefits than
under third party arrangements because a smaller portion of benefits
would be diverted to claimant lawyer fees; tort claim lawyer fees typi-
cally fall in the 20-35% range, while workers' compensation lawyer fees
run at about half those amounts-frequently applied not to the full lump
sump (as with third party claims) but to smaller portions of the recovery.
And I hazard the guess that lawyer representation is more common for
third party, tort-based claims than in workers' compensation cases.
The estimate does not take into account the increasing number of
products liability claims and rapidly escalating judgments which neces-
sarily result in settlements larger than those assumed in making the
estimate presented here.
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